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Women and the Law:
A Dialogue with
Ruth Bader Ginsburg

that the Supreme Court had said yes to a
woman; the first time the Court recognized women as victims of discrimination.

With this issue, we begin a dialogue on
women and the law. We are interested in
receiving brief comments as well as longer
essays on legal issues of general concern.

A Favor
to the Ladies

Ruth Bader Ginsburg is a professor of law
at Columbia University. Many of the cases
she bas argued have been pivotal in the
Supreme Court's recognition of the exist·
ence of women's rights in this country.
The following discussion was held in
April 1975 with representatives of the
Association of Women in Science (A WIS).
It is reprinted, with permission, from the
Spring 1975 (Vol. IV, No. 2) issue of the
AWIS Newsletter.

also significant because it was a unanimous
decision. Until 1971, when a woman came
to the Court with a complaint of discrimination against her, the Court found some
reason to uphold the law. Efforts to use
the 14th Amendment to give women the
right to vote failed, and it took a consti·
tutional amendment to correct this.
Efforts to obtain a Supreme Court declara·
tion that women should be on juries the
same way men are were not successful
until this year. Laws that restricted
women's opportunities in the labor market
were accepted on the grounds that they
helped and protected women, even if they
meant a woman could not bid for a job
which she wanted because she was not per·
mitted to work more than a certain number
of hours per day. Almost every time a
classification based on sex came before the
Court, the Justices ruled that the gender
line would be regarded as a favor to the
ladies. In Reed v. Reed, the Supreme
Court said that legislatures could not con·
tinue to make these gross classifications
based on sex alone.

AWIS: Professor Ginsburg, having argued
several important sex-discrimination cases
before the Supreme Court, which one
would you consider pivotal in terms of
women's rights?
GINSBURG: Each case that has been
successful in the Supreme Court has been
an important advance. The first case in
which the Supreme Court responded to a
woman's complaint of sex discrimination
under the Constitution was Reed v. Reed
(414 U.S. 71). In that case, I prepared the
brief together with ACLU's legal director
and several law students. Idaho lawyers
argued the case. It was a very simple legal
issue; the statute stated that when two per·
sons were related to a decedent in the same
degree, and both wanted to be appointed
administrator of the estate, and one was
female and the other was male, the male
had to be preferred to the female. Almost
anyone would recognize that the statute
was discriminatory, and you might think
the issue too obvious to yield a major
precedent. However, it was tremendously
significant in that it represented the first
time ever in the history of the country

AWIS: When was that?
GINSBURG: 1971. The Reed case was

Children Declared Parentless

The next case, Stanley v. Illinois (405
U.S. 645), followed soon after Reed.
Peter Stanley had lived with a woman 18
years, the couple had three children, and
she died. They had never married and the
state declared the children paren tless.
Peter Stanley, with the aid of a legal ser·
vices attorney, challenged the law that
declared him a nonparent. The legislation
was based on the presumption that a
woman, married or not, loved her children,
and would want them; a man who was not
married would have no affection for these
children, and would not want custody .
The Court said in 1972 that although this
may be true in a great many cases, it's not
true in all cases, and that Peter Stanley
should have a presumed right to custody.

Breadwinners and Dependents

In 197 3, a major precedent was set in
Frontiero v. Richardson (411 U.S. 677).
Married military men were paid a housing
allowance and provided free medical and
dental care for their wives. Servicewomen
who were married received no housing
allowance and no free medical or dental
care for their husbands unless the woman
proved that she contributed more than
half her husband's support (more than
three-quarters support of the family unit).
Lt. Sharron Frontiero was supplying more
than half of the total family income.
However, since her husband was providing
just over half of his own support, or one·
quarter of the family support, he didn't
qualify for medical or dental benefits, and
the family unit didn't qualify for a housing
allowance. The Supreme Court said that
this was unconstitutional.
Four of the
Justices joined in an opinion declaring that
sex classifications should be reviewed with
the same stringency as race classifications.
Four others purported to apply the test
that what the legislature does must be
rational. Eight Justices agreed that it was
irrational to give these benefits to the
serviceman for his family and not to the
servicewoman for her family. Frontiero
v. Richardson was very important, more
important than Reed v. Reed, because it
hit at the line drawn most frequently in
the law between men and women, a line
that types males as breadwinners, females
asdependents . Our social security laws are
based on that model. As Martha Griffiths
has put it, when our social security laws
came in in the late 1930s, they presumed
a land where all men were breadwinners
and all women were men's dependents.
As we progress in time, that pattern becomes less and less true. When you type
the woman as a dependent and you benefit
her only when she conforms to that vision,
you disadvantage her when she's working.
So the Frontiero case was a vital break·
through. The decision indicated that the
Court was going to take a close look at
classifications that treat breadwinner as a
synonym for man, and dependent as a
synonym for woman.
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The ERA

Mrs. Robinson's Beauty Parlor for Negroes, c. 1919. Byron Collection, Museum of the City of New
York. Between 1880 and 1920, the number of women who listed themselves for the New York City
census as hairdressers jumped from 410 to 3,691. From "Women at Work" exhibition.

The most recent case developing the
Frontiero theme was Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld (decided March 19, 197 5 ), and
it involved exactly the same type of assumption on the part of the legislature.
If a wage-earning ma~ dies and leaves a
child and spouse, the child and widow
get social security benefits on the assumption that the widow will want to stay home
and take care of the child. If a wage-earning woman dies leaving a spouse with minor
children in his care, the law doesn't provide any benefits for the widower. The
Congressional assumption was that no
father would want to stay home and take
care of the child. We don't even give him
the choice. He's supposed to be out there
winning bread; he 's not supposed to be at
home. The whole effort in the several sexdiscrimination cases I helped brief and
argued as an ACLU attorney (including
Frontiero and Wiesenfeld) was to get the
courts to appreciate that classification by
gender is invidious, and just as invidious as
classification by the color of your skin,
your religion, or where your ancestors
came from. The law should be neutral.
It's perfectly all right for the law to classify on the basis of a function a person performs, so it can deal with a homemaker or
a wage-earner, but it can't use man in lieu
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of wage-earner or woman in lieu of homemaker.
Labels That
Are Subterfuges
AWIS: Can you discuss any pending cases?
GINSBURG: Yes, several cases involve

principal wage-earner tests in employment.
The Constitutional cases must involve
government employment, or employmentrelated social security benefits,because the
Constitutional protection is only against
state action, not private action. One such
case involves a federal agency that paid
certain fringe benefits to a worker if that
worker supplied 55 percent or more of the
family income. The classification is not
based on sex, at least on the face of it.
The principal wage-earner gets the benefits
and the other doesn't. In practice, however, that test says: the men get it and the
women don't. Historically, women have
been underpaid. They are pushed into
"woman's work" that gets paid less, and
even when they do the same work as men,
they're not paid the same. We're trying to
challenge labels that are subterfuges for
discrimination that was once established
by male and female classifications.

AWIS: What do you feel are the pros and
cons of the Equal Rights Amendment?
GINSBURG: First, I should disclose my
clear partisanship on this issue. I am a
strong proponent of the ERA. I think it is
necessary because we've never had in our
Constitution any statement reflecting the
view of our Constitution-makers that
women should have equal rights with men.
Certainly, in the 18th century that was
very far from the minds of the founding
fathers. They lived in a world where
married women had no independent property or contract rights and the husband
was the boss. This was the system we inherited from England. The notion was that
husband and wife were one, and the husband was the one . Nor was sex equality
in the minds of the framers of the 14th
Amendment. The Reconstruction Congress dealt with the burning issue of that
day, one that eclipsed all others ~ eradication of the odi_ous institution of black
slavery. There has never been deliberate
attention by anyone responsible for our
fundamental law to the proposition that
men and women should be treated equally
under the law. Because it is such a fundamental principle, it should be reflected
directly in the Constitution.
AWIS: Senator Ervin, a Constitutional
authority, feels there are enough safeguards in the Constitution as it now stands.
What is he referring to?
GINSBURG: I don't think Sen. Ervin has
given this issue the very careful attention
he has given to some other areas of the
law where he is a great Constitutional expert. In part his views are colored by his
own life experiences and by his own internalization of notions many men hold
today: that all differentials between men
and women created by the law are designed
to favor women . I think there is some of
that southern gentlemanly chivalry behind
the position that he takes . I have read
what he has said in the Congressional debates, and I think part of the problem is
that he has just shut his mind to the other
side. Nobody who reads Constitutional
history can really think that during the
past century the equal protection clause
has been a meaningful protection for

women. It was no protection at all until
1971, and even now the Court does feel
the restraint of history. It can go only so
far in dynamically interpreting a provision
that was not intended to have anything.to
do with women.
Storming the W.C.

Some of the objections that Senator
Ervin has raised border on the ridiculous.
For example, he said in debate in Congress
that we are not going to have separate
bathrooms anymore. But he knows that
there are many instances where two Constitutional principles have to be harmonized
and the Supreme Court has said there is a
right to privacy, as a matter of Constitutional principle. Try to imagine who would
challenge that type of separation. Is it a

man who wants access to the woman's
W.C. or a woman who wants access to the
man's? Another objection is that ERA
would eliminate the protective legislation
for women, but Sen. Ervin should know
that is also a disingenuous objection. Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 says
that for employment purposes men and
women are to be treated equally and that
any protective law must protect both sexes.
It should be apparent that many protective
laws have been used to protect men's jobs
from women's competition. However,
protective (or restrictive) labor legislation
for women only is dead as a Constitutional
issue; it's been handled on a statutory level
under Title VII and the ERA won't contribute anything new in that area. ERA
would simply duplicate the statutory command that safety and health protection

should be available for all workers.
Sen. Ervin is also troubled by the prospect of the military service for women.
I don't think he's ever taken a serious look
at the other side of that coin. At the
present time there are women who want
military careers or access to the military
academies and who don't have the same
opportunities as men. There are highly
restrictive quotas for women who want to
enlist; they have to meet higher qualifications than men, and they are denied many
training and educational opportunities
open to men. If you have a sex-neutral
system, that doesn't mean every woman
will be packed off to war. All the amendment prohibits is drawing the line on the
basis of sex. Distinctions, of course, may
be made on the basis of individual qualifications. If draft calls are ever reinstituted,

.,
Two Views of Maternity. Left, "Mother About to Wash Her Sleepy Child" (1880), by Mary Cassatt. Oil on canvas. Source: Los Angeles County
Museum of Art. Right, "Maternity" (1946), by Dorothea Tanning. Oil on canvas. Source: Collection of Jeffrey H. Loria. Both from "Women Artists:
1550-1950" exhibition, Brooklyn Museum.
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exemptions could be provided for individuals with primary responsibility for the
care of children, for example. And women
as well as men who cannot pass physical
fitness tests would be screened out.
A Fair Shake
in Academia?
AWIS: Is it legal for graduate schools to

put restrictions on women? Some departments have said women cannot marry or
have children during their graduate
education.
GINSBURG: Absolutely illegal. That is
clear under the HEW higher education
guidelines. They cannot differentiate in
their treatment of male and female employees. As far as their students are concerned, that is covered by Title IX of the
Educational Amendments of 1972. Title
IX guidelines are about to be issued in
final form and they prohibit that kind of
differential. If you want to have a rule
that says anybody who has children can't
be a student or teacher here, that's perhaps an option; but you can't limit that to
any woman. And what institution and
department would shun men who have
married or become fathers?
AWIS: What about women who have
dropped out of programs for these reasons do they have avenues to get back into
school? And what about lost benefits?
GINSBURG: The woman would have a
problem if she doesn't make a timely objection to discriminatory treatment, when
the law is there to protect her.
AWIS: HEW has the authority to bar funds
to employers who discriminate on the basis
of sex, many complaints have been filed,
and yet no funds have been barred. Why
not?
GINSBURG: Because first of all it's a
matter of low priority for HEW . Second,
government officials don't want to use the
ultimate sanction. They prefer to deal
with universities in terms of gentle persua s10n.
AWIS: Have they been successful in using
these other avenues?
GINSBURG: No, I think that women who
want a fair shake in academia cannot , ely
on HEW to achieve the result for them . A
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much more helpful avenue is Title VII
where the woman who feels she's been the
victim of discrimination doesn't have to
rely on any federal agency to make her
case for her. She has to file an administrative complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, but if the Commission doesn't act or accomplish the desired result, she can go right into court with
her own representative and be her own
"champion ."
The Letter But
Not the Spirit
AWIS: Have the courts begun to recognize that some institutions are supporting
the letter of the law, but certainly not the
spirit of the law?
GINSBURG: Yes. You can see that in one
case in particular, against the University of
Pittsburgh in the Sharon Johnson case .
(Principal counsel for plaintiff was Sylvia
Roberts.) It's far from over, but there's
already one spectacular district court
opinion, granting temporary injunctive
relief. The University was stopped from
throwing her out while they argued the
merits of the case . The University would
have liked to have gotten rid of her and
then she would have had to fight her way
back in from the outside. The court said
she had shown enough to indicate that a
vast pattern of discrimination against
women and blacks might exist in the University from top to bottom. In this case,
EEOC had conducted an investigation of
all job categories from the bottom rung
up to the tenure ranks, and the figures they
came up with created large suspicions. The
court said: based on the evidence presented,
she keeps her job during the period of the
lawsuit. We're not deciding ultimately
who's right or wrong, she's shown us a
strong enough case for us to say, the
status quo should be maintained pending
a full hearing and determination.
AWIS: Do you think Affirmative Action
has helped women in the university?

GINSBURG: I don't think the universities
have moved very much under Affirmative
Action-there
is no clout behind any of
HEW's directives . However, there is something about establishing a legal norm, even
if it doesn't get enforced the way it should
be. Discrimination is no longer as respectable as it once was.

A Postscript

The following is a postscript added by
Ruth Bader Ginsburg in 1977 :
Since 197 5, the Supreme Court's performance in gender-discrimination
cases has
been unsteady. The Court has ruled that a
state may not establish different majority
ages for girls and boys for purposes of purchasing 3.2 beer (Craig v. Boren , 1976).
It has held that Congress may not differentiate by gender in allocating old-age and
survivors' benefits to the spouse of a wageearner covered by social security (Califano
v. Goldfarb, 1977). Attempting to distinguish genuinely compensatory legislation from laws rooted in "romantic paternalism" and "role-typing," the Court
upheld the more favorable social security
benefit calculation accorded working
women until 1972 (Califano v. Webster,
1977). All these decisions are on the plus
side. On the other hand, the Court declared, in General Electric v. Gilbert,
197 6, that discrimination based on pregnancy is not gender-based discrimination
at all! And confronted with the question
of whether Philadelphia could exclude
girls from Central High, the city 's oldest
and most prestigious public secondary
school, the Court threw up its hands.
Split down the middle after reading the
briefs and hearing arguments, the Justices
could take no action, and the judgment
handed down (2-1 for the School District)
remains the last word in the controvers y
( Vorchh eim er v. School District of Philadelphia , 1977) .
Still conspicuous is the Court's tendency
to shy away from doctrinal developm ent .
The Equal Rights Amendment would relieve the Court's anxiety, its reluctance to
shape new Constitutional doctrine without
a firm root for that doctrine in the nation's
fundamental instrument of government. D

